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case did not fall into the area where the burden shifts to the relator.
Thus, it was his opinion that the burden should have remained with the
prosecution to show that the waiver was knowingly and understandingly
made, and that it was not on the relator to prove otherwise.
It is the opinion of this writer that considerable difficulty would be
alleviated if a form were to be prepared and given to arresting officers
as well as trial judges that would clearly explain not only the right of
an accused, but would also explain with no chance of error that free coun-
sel would be provided if the accused could not afford his own." This
would not eliminate all problems, for if the accused still wished to waive
his rights, the issue of whether he knew what he was doing would still
be present, but the factors presently used to determine this particular issue
could still be used. Most importantly, however, there would be no differ-
ences in a court's questions to an accused regarding counsel, and the issue
of whether the accused was aware of the availability of no-cost court-
appointed counsel could be eliminated from all appeals.
Michael J. Aranson
SALES-WARRANTIES-Conforming tender by adjustment or minor re-
pair-Under the Uniform Commercial Code, where the seller was denied
access and a reasonable opportunity to conform a defective tender by
adjustment or minor repair rather than by substituting new merchandise,
the buyer failed to show a breach of warranty entitling him to either new
merchandise or rescission.
Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
Plaintiff Scampoli brought an action to rescind a sales contract for a color
television set with a malfunctioning color control. Plaintiff had demanded
a new set, but defendant Wilson TV Service only proffered to repair the
color malfunction. However, defendant was denied access to the set.
with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to
represent him. Without this additional warning, the admonition of the right to
consult with counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult
with a lawyer if he has one or has the funds to obtain one. The warning of a right
to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that would convey to the in-
digent-the person most often subjected to interrogation-the knowledge that he too
has a right to have counsel present .... [Only with effective and express explana-
tion to the indigent of this right can there be assurance that he was truly in a
position to exercise it.
18. The Pittsburgh Police Superintendent's Memo No. 18-66, which outlines police in-
vestigation procedures, has the following instruction: "He must also be told that he has the
right to consult with an attorney before or during police questioning, and if he does not have
the money to hire a lawyer, a lawyer will be appointed ..... " [Emphasis added.]
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Plaintiff maintained that delivery of such a set is a breach of both the
implied warranty of merchantability1 and the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose2 and as such is a basis for the right to rescind
the sale. Defendant contended that he could make minor repairs on the
set in order to provide a conforming tender.' The trial court granted
rescission and directed the return of the purchase price plus interest and
costs.
On appeal the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court's decision and held that the seller (appellant Wilson) had a
right to conform his defective tender by adjustment or minor repair rather
than by substituting new merchandise.' Thus, since the buyer (appellee
Scampoli) had denied the seller an opportunity to repair he could not
allege a breach of either warranty entitling him to rescission or a new set.'
The history of the remedy of rescission is marked by doubt and inde-
cision on the part of courts.' By far the greatest doubt arose in cases
involving a buyer's right to rescind on the ground of breach of implied
warranty.' In England at common law, rescission of a contract of sale
for breach of implied warranty8 was not available to a buyer. The English
courts reasoned that a warranty was an express or implied statement of
something which the seller undertakes with respect to the article sold,
yet collateral to the express object of the sale,9 therefore, the sales con-
tract served merely to pass title to the goods sold and consequently the
question of warranties was collateral to this main purpose. However, in
1. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-314 (Supp. V, 1966). Under section 2-314 of the Code, an
implied warranty of merchantability arises in all sales in which the seller is a merchant in
goods of that kind. "Merchant" is defined in U.C.C. Sec. 2-104. The warranty extends beyond
the manufacturer to include the seller who is principally a conduit in the marketing system.
See Comment 2 to U.C.C. Sec. 2-314.
2. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-315 (Supp. V, 1966). Section 2-315 of the Code sets forth the
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. It provides that where the buyer gives
the seller reason to know a particular purpose for which the goods are to be used, and that
the buyer is relying upon the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish satisfactory goods,
an implied warranty will arise that the goods are fit for such purpose. Comment 2 to U.C.C.
Sec. 2-315 makes it clear that the buyer's particular purpose must differ from the ordinary
purpose for which such goods are used. If the purpose is only an ordinary one the warranty of
merchantability will apply. See Comment 4 to U.C.C. Sec. 2-315.
3. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-508 (Supp. V, 1966).
4. 228 A.2d at 850.
5. 228 A.2d at 850.
6. See Hermann, Reformation and Rescission, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 1.
7. See Comment, Award of Damages in Addition to Rescission In Sale of Goods, 14 ST.
JOHN's L. REV. 124 (1939).
8. Street v. Blay, 109 Eng. Rep. 1212 (1831); Parson v. Sexton, 136 Eng. Rep. 763
(1847).
9. For a review of the origin and development of the implied warranties of mer-
chantability and fitness for a particular purpose from English common law to the present,
see Lauer, Sales Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 Mo. L. REv. 259 (1965).
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this country at common law several jurisdictions allowed rescission of
an executed sale for breach of either an implied or express warranty.10
Moreover, the early Civil Law gave the buyer no remedy for defects
of quality in the goods sold, its maxim being in effect, caveat emptor."
The development away from caveat emptor occurred in the Civil Law
with the Aedilician Edict, "the policy of which was to permit the buyer to
set aside the contract and recover the purchase price if paid should the
seller fail to supply a thing for effective use.""
Codification of the common law concepts of sales occurred in this coun-
try with the drafting in 1906 of the Uniform Sales Act 13 which was to serve
as a statutory guide to the law of the marketplace. The Uniform Sales
Act, moreover, permitted rescission for any breach of warranty. 4 Thus
10. Authorities are compiled at length in 3 S. WLLISTON, SALES § 608a (rev. ed. 1948).
Pennsylvania was among those jurisdictions that at common law denied rescission for breach
of warranty. See Kase v. John, 10 Watts (Pa.) 107, 36 Am. Dec. 148 (1840); Eshleman v.
Lightner, 169 Pa. 46, 32A. 63 (1895). Even in jurisdictions that denied rescission for
breach of warranty, if the basis of the breach of warranty was fraud, a remedy was granted.
See Owens v. Sturges, 67 Ill. 366 (1873) ; Nelson v. Martin, 105 Pa. 229 (1884) ; Freyman v.
Knecht, 78 Pa. 141 (1875).
11. For a discussion of buyer's rights under early Civil Law, see Gow, A Comment On
the Warranty In Sale Against Latent Defects, 10 McGiLL L.J. 248 (1965).
12. Id. at 249.
13. The Uniform Sales Act (hereinafter cited as U.S.A.) was drafted in 1906 and was
largely the work of Professor Samuel Williston. The Sales Act followed closely the English
Sale of Goods Act, 1893. See, FARNSWORTH & HONNOLD, COMMERCIAL LAW 5 (1965).
14. U.S.A. § 69(1) provides:
(1) Where there is a breach of warranty by the seller, the buyer may, at his
election-
(a) Accept or keep the goods and set up against the seller the breach of
warranty by way of recoupment in diminution or extinction of the price.
(b) Accept or keep the goods and maintain an action against the-seller for
damages for breach of warranty.
(c) Refuse to accept the goods, if the property therein has not passed, and
maintain an action against the seller for breach of warranty.
(d) Rescind the contract to sell or the sale and refuse to receive the
goods, or if the goods have already been received, return them or offer to return them
to the seller and recover the price or any part thereof which has been paid.
This all inclusive rescission provision was criticized by Professor Llewellyn:
. ..rejection or rescission for non-troubling defects will be bad policy ...
the Sales Act requirement of exact compliance, coupled not only with
rejection but with rescission, cuts like an Arctic blast. It is an invitation to
throw back the risk of any dropping market upon a seller who has per-
formed as a reasonable seller should perform.
Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37 CoLum. L. REV. 341, 389 (1937).
The English Sale of Goods Act, made correspondence to description an implied condition
of the contract, which permitted rejection for breach of condition, but still refused to allow
rescission for breach of warranty since warranties were considered as being collateral to the
main purpose of the contract. See Note, Rescission-Rescinding Buyer's Right to Damages for
Breach of Warranty, 33 MrIN. L. REv. 409 (1949). See also Lauer, Sales Warranties Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 Mo. L. Rxv. 259, 260 (1965).
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the Sales Act required the adoption of an inflexible rule of rescission by
the courts that in effect failed to accommodate the interests of both buyer
and seller in the commercial marketplace.'
Therefore, in Waldman Produce, Inc. v. Frigidaire Corp.'" the buyer
was permitted to rescind and recover the purchase price in addition to
damages17 for a refrigerator with a defective temperature control even
though the seller was not afforded an opportunity to repair the defective
control or to substitute a new refrigerator.
The remedies given the buyer under the Uniform Commercial Code 8
also parallel those of the Uniform Sales Act, although rescission under
the Code is called "revocation of acceptance."'"
Despite substantive and procedural similarities,2" decisions like Wald-
man Produce, Inc. v. Frigidaire Corp." which abuse the remedy of rescis-
sion and result in over protection of the buyer are rejected by the Uniform
Commercial Code. The rejection is based on the concept of "cure," Sec-
tion 2-508 of the Uniform Commercial Code22 affording the seller an
opportunity to cure a defective tender. Section 2-508(2) is of significance
since it states that even after the time for performance has passed, a seller
who has made a defective tender can still, upon seasonable notificatioi
to the buyer, have a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming
tender. 3 Subsection (2), therefore, seeks to avoid injustice to the seller
by reason of surprise rejection by the buyer.24
15. For a discussion of the seller's dilemma under the U.S.A. see Honnold, Buyer's Right
of Rejection, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 457 (1949).
16. 284 N.Y.S. 167 (App. T. 1935).
17. U.S.A. §§ 69, 70, 73.
18. Pennsylvania became the first state to adopt the Uniform Commercial Code (herein-
after cited as U.C.C.) by enacting the 1952 draft, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 1-101 to 10-104
(1954), which was subsequently amended to conform with the 1962 draft of the U.C.C.
The U.C.C. became effective in the District of Columbia on Jan. 1, 1965, D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 28:1-101 to 28:9-507 (Supp. V, 1966).
19. U.C.C. § 2-608 (1962).
20. For a comparison of rights and remedies under the U.S.A. and the U.C.C., see Note,
A Comparison of the Rights and Remedies of Buyers and Sellers Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and the Uniform Sales Act, 49 KY. L.J. 270 (1960).
21. 284 N.Y.S. 167 (App. T. 1935). See text accompanying note 13, supra.
22. U.C.C. § 2-508 (1962): Cure by Seller of Improper Tender or Delivery; Replacement.
(1) Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected because non-conforming and
the time for performance has not yet expired, the seller may seasonably notify the buyer of
his intention to cure and may then within the contract time make a conforming delivery.
(2) Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the seller had reasonable
grounds to believe would be acceptable with or without money allowance the seller may if
he seasonably notifies the buyer have a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming
tender.
23. To the extent to which subsection (2) modified existing law in Pennsylvania see the
Pennsylvania Bar Association Notes to U.C.C. § 2-508, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-508.
24. Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-508 (1962).
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The question arises, therefore, as to what constitutes a conforming
tender by the seller after the contract date has passed. There can be little
doubt that replacement with new merchandise would serve to satisfy the
conforming tender provision of subsection (2). The novel decision by the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals extends the concept of cure, which
had been proposed as a means for curing defective tenders of title25 , to
include minor repairs and adjustments by the seller in "quality" cases
in order to substitute a conforming tender.
In the instant case the court noted that a dealer would certainly expect
and have reasonable grounds to believe that the buyer would accept mer-
chandise such as a new color television set delivered as crated at the
factory and that if it proved defective would afford the seller an oppor-
tunity to substitute conforming tender. 6
The opinion, written by Judge Myers,27 concluded that prior case law
provided no mandate requiring the buyer to accept substantially repaired
articles as conforming tender in lieu of new goods. Judge Myers decided,
however, that prior cases indicated that minor repairs and reasonable
adjustments are contemplated as remedies under implied warranties.2 8
Specifically, Judge Myers referred to L.&N. Sales Co. v. Little Brown
lug Inc.29 where after the seller was unable to cure his non-conforming
tender by minor repairs and later refused to accept return of the articles,
he was held to have breached the warranties of merchantability and fit-
ness for a particular purpose, and Hall v. Everett Motor, Inc.3 where
''several references were made in the ruling to the seller's unsuccessful
attempts at repairs." 3'
Judge Myers took a flexible approach to the doctrine of cure, holding
that it should include the right of the seller to repair minor defects in his
tender before the buyer triggers the action of rescission, especially where
such repair is of no great burden or inconvenience to the buyer.32 There-
fore, the court stated that it was not necessary to determine whether the
actions of the seller constituted a breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability or the implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
25. See Hawkland, Curing an Improper Tender of Title to Chattels: Past, Present, and
Commercial Code, 46 MiNN. L. REV. 697, (1962).
26. 228 A.2d at 850.
27. With whom Hood, C. J., and Quinn, J., concur.
28. 228 A.2d at 849.
29. 12 Pa. D. & C.2d 469 (1957).
30. 340 Mass. 430, 165 N.E.2d 107 (1960).
31. 228 A.2d at 850.
32. To this effect the court in Wilson (at 850 of 228 A.2d) quoted from Hawkland,
Curing an Improper Tender of Title to Chattels: Past, Present and Commercial Code, 46
Mixe. L. REv. 697, 724 (1962): "The seller, then, should be able to cure the defect under
subsection 2-508(2) in those cases in which he can do so without subjecting the buyer to any
great inconvenience, risk or loss."
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pose as breach becomes moot unless an opportunity to cure is afforded
the seller.3
Decisions like that of the instant case serve to give the Uniform Com-
mercial Code a desirable and commercially expedient flexibility by accom-
modating the interests of both buyer and seller in the commercial market-
place.
Daniel W. Cooper
WILLS-GENERAL POWERS OF APPOINTMENT-Exercise of a power by a
general bequest or devise in a will-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in applying Section 14(14) of the Wills Act of 1947 has clarified the law
by holding that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to prove a contrary
intent.
Jaekel Estate, 424 Pa. 433, 227 A.2d 851 (1967).*
The donor, through the provisions in his will gave the donee a legal life
estate in all his property and provided that the donee was to have a gen-
eral testamentary power of appointment over such property. There was
a gift over in default of appointment to a specifically named child of the
donor and donee. Subsequently, the donee died and her will provided that
the child was to receive the residue of the estate.
At distribution questions arose as to the assessment of the Federal
Estate tax liability and whether the Federal Estate Tax attached to the
property subject to the power of appointment.' These questions were
dependent upon whether or not the donee by will had exercised the power
of appointment. Under the provisions of Section 2041 (a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 if the donee of a general power of appointment
exercises the power, the value of the appointive property is included in
determining the value of the donee's estate for the purpose of computing
the Federal Estate Tax. If the power of appointment was not exercised
by the donee then the portion of the tax that would be computed on the
value of the appointive property would be avoided.' The Orphans Court
33. 228 A.2d at 849.
* Case research was aided by the electronic legal information retrieval techniques of the
Health Law Center, University of Pittsburgh.
1. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2041(a).
2. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2041 (a).
§ 2041. Powers of appointment
a. In general-the value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property.
1. Powers of appointment . . .- to the extent of any property with respect
to which a general power of appointment . . . is exercised by the de-
cedent-
(A) by will ...
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